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Laundering the Art Market: A Proposal 
for Regulating Money Laundering 
Through Art in the United States 
Alessandra Dagirmanjian* 
As high-net worth individuals have increasingly viewed art as 
a method of diversifying their portfolios, prices in the high-end 
global art market have exploded in the past several years. At the 
same time, investors have developed new methods for accessing 
art’s liquidity, such as art lending services and exchanges. While 
the changing character of art towards an asset class has opened 
the door to new investment opportunities, it has also left the art 
market particularly vulnerable to money laundering schemes. 
Existing characteristics of the art market, including a lack of 
uniform record-keeping standards among dealers and the 
speculative nature of art, also make it hospitable to this crime. In 
light of the art market’s vulnerability to money laundering, the 
need for legislation specifically addressing the industry seems 
clear. Yet, professional art intermediaries raise legitimate 
concerns about the compliance burdens and loss of confidentiality 
that accompany a regulatory scheme. This Note addresses the 
existing tension between potential anti-money laundering 
legislation and art dealers’ interests, and proposes regulatory 
solutions to prevent money laundering through art without 
disrupting the art market.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2014, the United States charged Philip Rivkin with 
fraud in the sale of biodiesel credits producing more than 
$29,000,000 in profit.1 In what was likely an attempt to conceal the 
fraud, Rivkin purchased more than $18,000,000 worth of art, with 
his illicit gains.2 His collection included high-value works such as 
a photograph by Edward Weston worth $165,000 and a $675,000 
Alfred Stieglitz photograph.3 U.S. authorities discovered the 
works, which Rivkin had kept in storage in Houston, right before 
he attempted to ship them to Spain.4 As the government began 
seizing Rivkin’s photographs, he made no attempt to salvage them, 
likely because he had already stored money in several other assets 
abroad, and thus, saving the photographs “was not worth his time 
or effort.”5 
Rivkin’s failed plot to ship millions of dollars of art abroad is 
just one example of money laundering, the process through which 
a criminal cleanses the proceeds of a crime so they appear 
 
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Houston Man Charged with Biofuels Fraud 
Scheme (June 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/houston-man-charged-biofuels-
fraud-scheme [https://perma.cc/Y29T-R2HH] [hereinafter Biofuels Fraud Scheme]. A 
court later sentenced Rivkin to 121 months in prison for fraud under the Clean Air Act. 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Houston Man Sentenced to More than 10 Years in 
Prison for Biodiesel Fraud Scheme (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/houston-man-sentenced-more-10-years-prison-biodiesel-fraud-scheme [https://perma.cc
/Y72U-4Vff]. The government charged him with money laundering as well, although he 
was not convicted on those charges. Biofuels Fraud Scheme, supra. 
2 Mario Parker et al., The Fake Factory that Pumped Out Real Money, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 13, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-fake-biofuel-
factory/ [https://perma.cc/HVG5-8WCJ] (citing Special Agent Lea Bauer); Press Release, 
U.S. Att’y’s Office Dist. of N.J., Forfeiture of More than $15 Million Worth of Artwork 
Sought by U.S. Attorney’s Office (Mar. 1, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr
/forfeiture-more-15m-worth-artwork-sought-us-attorney-s-office [https://perma.cc/8JS3-
6242]. 
3 Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office Dist. of N.J., supra note 2. 
4 Parker et al., supra note 2. 
5 Id. 
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legitimate to investigators and law enforcement.6 Historically, 
money launderers have cleansed their illicit proceeds through a 
series of wiring transactions involving a traditional financial 
institution like a bank.7 However, since the enactment of the Bank 
Secrecy Act (the “BSA”), which directly targets money laundering 
through banks, launderers have increasingly turned to luxury 
markets such as the real estate market to accomplish the same 
task.8 
As Rivkin’s case and others’ demonstrate, the modern art 
market has also become particularly vulnerable to money 
laundering. This vulnerability is due in part to the changing 
character of art and the global art market.9 As high-net-worth 
individuals increasingly turn to art as a method of diversifying 
their portfolios and storing value in the long term, prices in the top 
end of the art market have exploded,10 leading to record sales such 
as Jean-Michel Basquiat’s painting, Untitled, for $110,000,000 at 
Sotheby’s in New York.11 The movement towards investment in 
art has also facilitated new methods for doing so, such as art 
lending services, art exchanges, and art funds, that theoretically 
increase investors’ ability to access art’s value.12 Yet, while the 
price of art and investors’ ability to access its value have increased, 
 
6 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33315, MONEY LAUNDERING: AN 
OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. § 1956 AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2017). 
7 Hannah Purkey, Note, The Art of Money Laundering, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 111, 115 
(2010); Money Laundering, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering [https://perma.cc/4D6W-DH47] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
8 Jeffrey R. Boles, Million Dollar Ghost Buildings: Dirty Money Flowing Through 
Luxury Real Estate Markets, 45 REAL EST. L.J. 476, 486 (2017). 
9 See infra Section I.D.1. 
10 Alice Xiang, Comment, Unlocking the Potential of Art Investment Vehicles, 127 
YALE L.J. 1698, 1700 (2018); ART & FINANCE REPORT 2017, DELOITTE 117 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/at/Documents/finance/art-and-finance-
report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RK4-9ZH5]. 
11 Clare McAndrew, The Art Market, ART BASEL & UBS 104 (2018), 
https://d2u3kfwd92fzu7.cloudfront.net/Art%20Basel%20and%20UBS_The%20Art%20
Market_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/82NA-G3UG]. 
12 See NOAH HOROWITZ, ART OF THE DEAL: CONTEMPORARY ART IN A GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKET 148 (2011); Monique Sofo, How to Monetize an Art Collection, 
CHRISTIE’S INT’L REAL EST.: LUXURY DEFINED (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.christiesrealestate.com/blog/how-to-monetize-an-art-collection 
[https://perma.cc/7KXD-YW3F]. 
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so too has the money launderer’s ability to monetize art for 
criminal ends.13 Unique characteristics of the art market also make 
it hospitable to money laundering14: professional art intermediaries 
do not maintain uniform standards for recordkeeping15 while the 
subjectivity of art and a lack of a standardized pricing 
methodology make its value somewhat speculative.16 Thus, the art 
market provides valuable assets that a launderer can purchase 
anonymously for an inflated price without raising government 
suspicion.17 
Despite these vulnerabilities, though, there is no existing 
regulatory scheme that directly targets the use of art for money 
laundering, and the art market maintains very little self-policing to 
prevent it.18 One recent proposal for legislation against money 
laundering in the art market, the Illicit Art and Antiquities 
Trafficking Prevention Act, would amend the Bank Secrecy Act to 
include “dealers in art or antiquities.”19 However, many art dealers 
and the organizations that represent them have pushed against this 
proposal and other regulations in the market because they threaten 
to impose high burdens of compliance on dealers while ignoring 
the legitimate reasons for maintaining privacy in art transactions.20 
Dealers also question whether art should be regulated in the same 
way as commodities with standardized valuations such as precious 
metals or coins.21 Yet, addressing money laundering is essential to 
the proper functioning of the art market as this crime reflects a 
 
13 See infra Section I.D.1. 
14 See infra Sections I.D.2–I.D.3. 
15 See Allyson Shea, Note, Shooting Fish in a Bliss Bucket: Targeting Money 
Launderers in the Art Market, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 665, 671–72 (2018). 
16 Id. at 672; HOROWITZ, supra note 12, at 170. 
17 See infra Sections I.D.2–I.D.3. 
18 See infra Section I.B. 
19 Illicit Art and Antiquities Trafficking Prevention Act, H.R. 5886, 115th Cong. (§ 
2(a)(3) 2018). 
20 Art Trade Reacts to Threatened Bank Secrecy Act, CULTURAL PROP. NEWS (June 25, 
2018), https://culturalpropertynews.org/congressman-wants-bank-secrecy-act-to-regulate-
art-trade [https://perma.cc/2VVZ-TRFB]. 
21 See Zachary Small, Does the Art World Have a Money Laundering Problem?, 
HYPERALLERGIC (Oct. 18, 2018), https://hyperallergic.com/465736/does-the-art-world-
have-a-money-laundering-problem [https://perma.cc/8VS4-T45T]. 
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complete disregard for artwork’s intangible aesthetic and cultural 
values. 
This Note explores the difficulties of imposing anti-money 
laundering regulations in the United States art market. Part I 
describes how the changing character of art, the unique culture of 
the art market, and a lack of regulation of professional art 
intermediaries have resulted in a vulnerable market. Part II lays out 
the tensions between the government’s and art dealers’ interests in 
regulating the market. Importantly, the same privacy that lends 
itself to money laundering is also essential to art dealers’ ability to 
attract and maintain clients. Part III proposes several regulatory 
approaches that address the unique culture of the art market, as 
well as a shift in art market practices towards more effective self-
regulation. 
I. MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH ART  
IN THE MODERN ART MARKET 
This Part describes how a rapidly expanding art market in the 
United States without regulatory barriers has led to a booming yet 
vulnerable market for money laundering. Section I.A provides an 
overview of the federal criminal definition of money laundering 
and the process of money laundering through art. Section I.B 
describes the lack of existing anti-money laundering regulation 
specifically targeted at the art market. Section I.C provides a brief 
overview of the changing character of art as an alternative asset 
and some of the ways investors have made art’s value more 
accessible. Section I.D explains how high prices and new 
investment methods, coupled with the unique characteristics of the 
art market make it particularly vulnerable to money laundering. 
A. Money Laundering Through Art Defined 
The Money Laundering Control Act (the “MLCA”),22 the 
federal statute that criminalizes money laundering in the United 
States, defines four types of money laundering: promotional, 
 
22 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2012). 
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concealment, structuring, and tax evasion.23 The most commonly 
known and most relevant type for the purposes of this Note is 
concealment, or the cleansing of illegal funds through a series of 
financial transactions.24 A criminal must cleanse the proceeds of a 
crime, because she cannot use them in the legitimate market, while 
they still hold the “taint” of the underlying illegal acts, without 
creating suspicion as to their origin.25 The MLCA defines this 
process as engaging in or attempting to engage in a financial 
transaction “knowing” it is designed to “conceal” the “nature, 
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds” 
of an “unlawful activity” and “knowing” that the property 
represents the proceeds of such “unlawful activity.”26 Courts have 
interpreted the use of the word “knowing” throughout section 1956 
of the MLCA to include “willful blindness or conscious 
avoidance.”27 Thus, a professional art intermediary could face 
criminal liability under section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) for willfully 
ignoring red flags suggesting her client is purchasing or selling a 
work of art to conceal the proceeds of a crime even if she did not 
have actual knowledge that her client was doing so.28 
The process of cleansing illicit gains can become quite 
complex depending on what method a criminal uses,29 but it 
typically involves three basic stages: placement, layering, and 
integration.30 In the placement stage, the first stage, the criminal 
disentangles her illicit proceeds from their most obvious ties to the 
 
23 DOYLE, supra note 6, at 2. 
24 See id. at 10 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). 
25 Purkey, supra note 7, at 114–15. 
26 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 
27 DOYLE, supra note 6, at 3, 3 n.21 (quoting United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d 
720, 725 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
28 See id. 
29 See, e.g., ABOUT THE NEED OF FORENSIC AND ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SERVICES 
FOR ART MARKET PROFESSIONALS, DELOITTE 3 (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/risk/lu-forensic-aml-art-market.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Z9HF-M3NM] (describing a process through which “a criminal organi[z]ation advises 
an alternative investment fund to acquire a master piece for its art portfolio, and is 
funding the purchase of the said piece via an art dealer located in a location where cash 
settlement of auction sale is legal and common.”). 
30 Purkey, supra note 7, at 115. 
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underlying crime by introducing them into the financial system.31 
The second stage, the layering stage, involves the movement of 
funds to get rid of any remaining traces of the underlying crime.32 
Finally, in the integration stage, the launderer can use the money, 
now free of its illegal taint, in the legitimate economy.33 Art is 
particularly vulnerable to money laundering in the placement and 
layering stages,34 but it can also be used in the integration stage.35 
For example, a money launderer might use her illicit cash to 
purchase a piece of art in the placement stage.36 Then in the 
layering stage, she might create a shell company to acquire 
ownership of the art—thus further distancing her identity from the 
original crime37—and then sell it.38 After selling the work, the 
money launderer would be free to use the proceeds in the 
legitimate economy.39 Alternatively, a money launderer might use 
the placement stage to break up her illicit proceeds into smaller 
amounts and then deposit these into a bank account.40 In the 
layering stage, she might purchase investment instruments or 
engage in a series of wiring transactions.41 Finally, in the 
integration stage, the launderer would invest the legitimate funds in 
luxury items, including artwork.42 
 
31 Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann, Twelve Methods of Money Laundering, 20 
J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 130, 131 (2017); FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra  
note 7. 
32 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 7. 
33 Id. 
34 Teichmann, supra note 31, at 133–34 (finding that art may be suitable for the 
placement and layering stages). 
35 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 7. 
36 Teichmann, supra note 31, at 133–34; Boles, supra note 8, at 480 (noting that a 
criminal might purchase assets during the placement stage). 
37 Monika Roth, Money Laundering and the Art Market, 11 JUSLETTER 6 (Jan. 11, 
2016) (Ger.). 
38 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 7; see also Roth, supra note 37, at 6; 
Boles, supra note 8, at 480 (explaining that a criminal might sell assets acquired during 
the placement stage in the layering stage). 
39 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 7. 
40 See id., supra note 7. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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B. Barriers to Money Laundering Through Art in the United 
States 
The MLCA and the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (“BSA”)43 are 
two pieces of legislation that act as substantial barriers to money 
laundering in the United States.44 However, there is currently no 
regulation that specifically targets money laundering in the art 
market, nor does the art market itself subject professional art 
intermediaries to any standards of professionalism that directly 
address money laundering. This Section describes the existing 
barriers to money laundering and the large gap that remains for 
money laundering through art. 
1. Government Oversight 
The BSA is the first piece of legislation aimed at preventing 
money laundering in the United States.45 Congress established the 
BSA in 1970 to prevent criminals from using banks to cleanse their 
illegal gains.46 The BSA authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury 
to enforce certain anti-money laundering requirements for banks 
and other nonbank businesses defined as “financial institutions.”47 
Subsequent legislation expanded anti-money laundering 
requirements under the BSA.48 First, the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-
Money Laundering Act set requirements for financial institutions 
to file Suspicious Activity Reports with the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).49 Congress later enacted the 
 
43 Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.). 
44 See Boles, supra note 8, at 482–84. 
45 Boles, supra note 8, at 482–83. 
46 Michael J. Anderson & Tracy A. Anderson, Anti-Money Laundering: History and 
Current Developments, 30 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 521, 523 (2015). 
47 RENA S. MILLER & LIANA W. ROSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL44776, ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING: AN OVERVIEW FOR CONGRESS 5 (2017). The Secretary of Treasury 
established the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), under the Secretary 
of the Treasury, to administer the BSA. Id. at 14; Anderson & Anderson, supra note 46, 
at 523. FinCEN is responsible for “issu[ing] guidance, advisories, and rules on BSA 
implementation and maintain[ing] the federal government’s database on required 
reporting by financial institutions and regulated industries, including suspicious activity 
reports (SARs) and currency transaction reports (CTRs).” MILLER & ROSEN, supra, at 14. 
48 MILLER & ROSEN, supra note 47, at 5, 10. 
49 Boles, supra note 8, at 483. 
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Patriot Act to combat terrorism financing.50 The Patriot Act 
increased the compliance burden for “financial institutions” by 
requiring that they establish at a minimum (1) the “development of 
internal policies, procedures and controls; (2) designation of a 
compliance officer; (3) an ongoing employee training program; 
and (4) an independent audit function to test programs.”51 
While the definition of “financial institutions” does not include 
professional art intermediaries, the BSA does already apply to 
them to some extent. For example, the Internal Revenue Service, 
under the authority of the BSA, requires that anyone in a trade or 
business who engages in a transaction or several related 
transactions of more than $10,000 in cash submit a report to 
FinCEN.52 As businesses, dealers in art or antiquities are required 
to report such transactions under the BSA.53 However, because 
professional intermediaries in the art market are not considered 
financial institutions under the BSA, they do not have to comply 
with its anti-money laundering standards or file suspicious activity 
reports.54 Thus, art dealers have little incentive other than good 
faith to flag possible money laundering schemes involving artwork 
for law enforcement.55 Furthermore, prosecutors often discover 
 
50 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and in other U.S. Code sections). 
51 Boles, supra note 8, at 493. Section 352(c) of the Patriot Act also tasks the Secretary 
of the Treasury with crafting anti-money laundering regulations that are “‘commensurate 
with the size, location, and activities’ of the financial institutions to which such 
regulations apply.” Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering 
Programs for Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 70 Fed. Reg. 33702, 33703 
(proposed June 9, 2005) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (citing USA PATRIOT Act 
§ 352(c)). 
52 Bank Secrecy Act, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-
businesses-self-employed/bank-secrecy-act [https://perma.cc/37AQ-87P4] (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2018); see also Anderson & Anderson, supra note 46, at 529–31. 
53 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 52; see Patricia Cohen, Valuable as Art, 
but Priceless as a Tool to Launder Money, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/arts/design/art-proves-attractive-refuge-for-money-
launderers.html [https://perma.cc/ZVV2-VUB8]. 
54 See Zachary Small, Art Dealers Could be Under More Financial Scrutiny with New 
US Bill, HYPERALLERGIC (June 25, 2018), https://hyperallergic.com/448705/bank-
secrecy-act-art-dealers-luke-messer [https://perma.cc/TF63-F5WR]; Cohen, supra  
note 53. 
55 See Cohen, supra note 53. 
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money laundering schemes involving art through suspicious 
banking activity or violations of customs laws rather than reports 
of cash transactions over $10,000.56 
2. Self-Regulation 
The art market itself maintains little oversight of its 
professionals in a way that would encourage them to help law 
enforcement prevent money laundering through art.57 The national 
professional trade organization for art dealers in the United States 
is the Art Dealers Association of America (“ADAA”).58 While the 
ADAA’s code of ethics generally requires that each member 
“comply with all applicable laws and regulations,” it does not 
maintain any ethical provisions pertaining to money laundering 
through art specifically.59 There are several state organizations for 
professional art dealers as well; however, these organizations have 
similarly unspecific ethical guidelines for their members.60 
Additionally, while the ADAA has 180 members, there are an 
estimated 1500 art dealers in New York City alone.61 Furthermore, 
dealers may join only by invitation from the ADAA’s board if they 
“have an established reputation for honesty, integrity and 
professionalism among their peers, and [] make a substantial 
contribution to the cultural life of the community by offering 
 
56 Id. 
57 Jason-Louise Graham, Art Exchange? How the International Art Market Lacks a 
Clear Regulatory Framework, in ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE MARKET 319, 337 
(Valentine Vadi & H.E.G.S. Schneider eds., 2014) (citing Patty Gerstenblith) (“[T]he art 
market is an active and vital segment of commercial transactions which require the 
formulation of a flexible and realistic yet also adequate model for protection of those 
consumers who do venture into that marketplace.”); see also Shea, supra note 15, at 673. 
58 About, ART DEALERS ASS’N AMERICA, https://www.artdealers.org/about/mission 
[https://perma.cc/4SF4-QJGF] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
59 Code of Ethics and Professional Practices, ART DEALERS ASS’N AMERICA, 
https://www.artdealers.org/about/code-of-ethics-and-professional-practices 
[https://perma.cc/Y85Y-TN2S] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
60 See, e.g., Code of Ethics, ART DEALERS ASS’N CALIFORNIA, 
http://artdealersassociation.org/CodeOfEthics.html [https://perma.cc/YQ3D-VWGF] 
(requiring that dealers “[w]ork to protect the community against those who would engage 
in unethical or illegal actions”) (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
61 ART DEALERS ASS’N AMERICA, supra note 58 Howard Halle, Best Art Galleries in 
New York City, TIMEOUT (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.timeout.com/newyork/art/best-
art-galleries-in-new-york-city-galleries [https://perma.cc/7SYC-YUKE]. 
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works of high aesthetic quality, presenting worthwhile exhibitions 
and publishing scholarly catalogues.”62 Finally, since dealers are 
not required to join the ADAA to practice in the art trade, they 
have practically no incentive to do so.63 Thus, with only a small 
handful of members who are already conducting reputable 
practices, the ADAA and state organizations do little to prevent the 
use of art for money laundering.64 
Auction houses are not subject to any oversight from within the 
market either. However, several of the major auction houses in the 
United States have their own anti-money laundering systems in 
place.65 For example, Christie’s global compliance team manages 
an anti-money laundering program, which includes staff training, 
due diligence, and record-keeping.66 The auction house also limits 
the amount of cash that a customer may use in the purchase of an 
item and does not allow third parties to pay for a work.67 Sotheby’s 
similarly restricts customers’ ability to pay through cash or a third 
party.68 Its guidelines provide, “[y]ou can pay by bank transfer, 
cheque or cash (subject to certain restrictions and legal limits). 
Certain credit cards are accepted at particular Sotheby’s 
locations . . . . Payment must be sent from the invoiced party and 
 
62 ART DEALERS ASS’N AMERICA, supra note 58; see also Shea, supra note 15, at 673. 
Similarly, the Art Dealers Association of California “carefully selects dealers committed 
to the profession, dealers in fine art who have earned an outstanding reputation in their 
communities for integrity and expert knowledge.” Qualifications for Membership, ART 
DEALERS ASS’N CALIFORNIA, http://www.artdealersassociation.org/Qualifications.html 
[https://perma.cc/FC24-WGZG] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
63 Shea, supra note 15, at 673 (noting that even well-known and reputable galleries 
such as Gagosian are not members of the ADAA). 
64 Id. 
65 Eileen Kinsella, US Art Dealers May Soon be Subject to Government Financial 
Regulation, ARTNET NEWS (May 2, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/us-art-
dealers-financial-regulation-1277351 [https://perma.cc/R85W-5L63]; see also, e.g., 
Compliance, SOTHEBY’S, https://www.sothebys.com/en/departments/compliance (last 
visited Dec. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T9B9-LXPZ]; Selling at Christie’s, CHRISTIE’S, 
https://www.christies.com/selling-services/selling-guide/financial-information 
[https://perma.cc/LF4H-5378] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
66 CHRISTIE’S, supra note 65. 
67  See id. 
68 Shea, supra note 15, at 674 n.53 (citing Buy & Sell, SOTHEBY’S, 
https://www.sothebys.com/en/buy-sell#buying-basics [https://perma.cc/56DG-ZSGN]). 
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not from a third party.”69 However, without any oversight from the 
government or the art market, it is not clear how effective these 
individual anti-money laundering programs actually are. 
C. The Modern Art Market 
Understanding the threat of money laundering in the modern 
art market requires an examination of the changing character of art. 
In recent years, the price of art, particularly in the high-end of the 
art market, has grown rapidly.70 This has brought attention not only 
from wealthy collectors but also from a new class of investors71 
that has developed new methods of increasing stability in the art 
market.72 This section describes the various impetuses behind 
massive growth in the high-end art market and provides two 
examples of new strategies for accessing the monetary value of art. 
1. The Rise of the Art Market 
The global art market has seen significant growth over the past 
several years.73 In 2017, sales in the art market totaled more than 
63 billion dollars, up 12% from 56 billion dollars in 2016.74 Three 
major auction houses, Sotheby’s, Christie’s, and Phillips, saw a 
total increase in sales of 18% from 2016.75 One extreme example 
of this growth is Christie’s sale of Leonardo DaVinci’s painting, 
Salvatore Mundi for $450,000,000 in 2017, the most money ever 
paid for a single piece of art.76 The United States is a key player in 
 
69 See id.  
70 Gaby Del Valle, Why is Art So Expensive?, VOX (Oct. 31, 2018, 1:50 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/31/18048340/art-market-expensive-ai-painting 
[https://perma.cc/EV5G-BBQ9]. 
71 See Graham, supra note 57, at 322. 
72 See id. at 324. 
73 See id. at 320. 
74 McAndrew, supra note 11, at 15. The market saw two years of contraction in 2015 
and 2016. 2017 Summary: The Art Market Enters a New Phase, ARTPRICE, 
https://www.artprice.com/artprice-reports/the-art-market-in-2017/2017-summary-the-art-
market-enters-a-new-phase [https://perma.cc/5S4M-YYQ8] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
75 DELOITTE, supra note 10, at 40. 
76 Del Valle, supra note 70; see also Paul Melton, Art Market Histories of the 20th 
Century, SOTHEBY’S INST. ART (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.sothebysinstitute.com/news-
and-events/news/art-market-histories-of-the-20th-century [https://perma.cc/2XAS-
RSWR]. 
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this global art market, maintaining the largest portion of total sales 
value of any country at 42%.77 The majority of this increase in 
value can be attributed to works at the top end of the market.78 
While sales by art dealers for less than $50,000 accounted for the 
majority of dealer transactions in 2017, they represented only 30% 
of the value of dealers’ total sales.79 The same is true in the auction 
market, where artists whose works sold for more than $10,000,000 
dominated the value of total sales, but accounted for only 0.2% of 
sellers at auction.80 
There are several forces behind this massive growth in high-
end transactions. First, the number of high-net-worth individuals—
investors who are often interested in purchasing luxury goods—has 
increased in the last several years.81 Additionally, the art market 
has become increasingly globalized as individuals from new 
countries begin to participate more and more in high-end 
transactions.82 Finally, the finance market has become increasingly 
interested in art as an asset class.83 Particularly, since the financial 
crisis in 2008, investors have sought out alternative assets, such as 
art and other collectibles for stability.84 While many financial 
experts are still skeptical about art’s ability to provide significant 
returns in the long term,85 wealth managers are beginning to view 
 
77 McAndrew, supra note 11, at 15. 
78 Del Valle, supra note 70. 
79 McAndrew, supra note 11, at 56. 74% of sales by professional intermediaries in 
2017 were for less than $50,000. Id.  
80 Id. at 122–23. “Just 25 artists accounted for nearly half of all contemporary auction 
sales in the first six months of 2017.” Del Valle, supra note 70. 
81 Kyle Sommer, The Art of Investing in Art, J.P. MORGAN, 
https://www.jpmorgan.com/country/US/en/jpmorgan/is/thought/magazine/3Q2013/art 
[https://perma.cc/XVV4-4H23] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
82 See id. For example, individuals from China, Russia, and the Middle East have 
increasingly taken part in transactions in the global art market. Id. Additionally, China 
surpassed the United Kingdom for the second largest share of value in the global art 
market in 2010, despite holding less than 5% of the market’s value in 2006. McAndrew, 
supra note 11, at 34. 
83 See generally DELOITTE, supra note 10. 
84 Graham, supra note 57, at 322. 
85 McAndrew, supra note 11, at 13. Global Chief Investment Officer of UBS, Mark 
Haefele, explains that art does not provide some of the long term benefits that stocks and 
bonds do, such as “dividends, coupons, and risk premia, and the opportunity to diversify, 
rebalance, and liquidate.” Id.  
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art as a new method of diversifying a portfolio.86 There are several 
theoretical benefits to adding art to a wealth management offering. 
First, art may have a low correlation with other asset classes, such 
that it performs better than stocks and bonds during periods of 
economic decline.87 Art can also be an effective way to store value 
when the market faces a period of inflation.88 Finally, art prices 
have tended to rise over long periods of time, thus offering at least 
moderate returns as long-term investments.89 
2. Accessing the Value of Art: Dealing with Illiquidity in the 
Art Market 
Despite its benefits as an alternative asset, art has several 
inefficiencies that inhibit investment opportunities.90 One aspect of 
art that is prohibitive to investment is its illiquidity.91 Collectibles 
like art tend to be illiquid92 in part because purchasing and selling 
them requires large transaction costs that offset their value.93 
Unlike a sale of stock, a collector cannot sell his Picasso by simply 
pushing a button.94 For example, it typically takes an auction house 
three to six months after consignment to sell a piece of art.95 
During this time, the owner will have to pay for storage of the 
work, as well as its maintenance.96 These costs can significantly 
 
86 Xiang, supra note 10, at 1700; DELOITTE, supra note 10, at 36, 117 (finding that 
48% of wealth managers surveyed stated that the best reason to include art in a portfolio 
is for diversification and 88% said that art should be included as part of a wealth 
management offering). 
87 Xiang, supra note 10, at 1700. 
88 Id. at 1700–01. 
89 Sommer, supra note 81. 
90 Adriano Picinati di Torcello, Why Should Art be Considered as an Asset Class?, 
DELOITTE 20 (2010), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents
/financial-services/artandfinance/lu-art-asset-class-122012.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NLQ-
CLQD]. 
91 Xiang, supra note 10, at 1713–15. 
92 “Illiquid refers to the state of a security or other asset that cannot easily be sold or 
exchanged for cash without a substantial loss in value.” Illiquid, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/illiquid.asp [https://perma.cc/3HWU-KFV7] (last 
visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
93 Xiang, supra note 10, at 1710. 
94 HOROWITZ, supra note 12, at 170. 
95 Id. 
96 Xiang, supra note 10, at 1710. 
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offset the value the owner of the work will receive in the sale.97 
Additionally, art is unique and subject to trends and personal 
tastes, which means there may not always be demand for a work in 
the market, making it difficult for the investor to sell right away.98 
Thus, illiquidity can be prohibitive to investors attempting to 
access the monetary value of a work of art quickly. It is also 
prohibitive to purchasers who cannot afford to commit significant 
capital to an asset without knowing they will be able to sell it for 
cash any time soon.99 
Investors have used several methods to combat this illiquidity. 
One way to avoid substantial transaction costs between the 
acquisition and sale of a work of art is through the use of 
freeports.100 As the art market has expanded in the past several 
years, so too has the need for space to store one’s work.101 
Freeports are tax-free and duty free storage spaces for art and other 
collectibles.102 Investors often store a work of art to keep it out of 
sight so that they can create greater demand for it by later 
reintroducing it to the market as a “fresh” work.103 Freeports allow 
the investor to store the work without incurring certain significant 
costs during the period between purchase and sale.104 A second 
method through which investors have combatted art’s illiquidity is 
 
97 Id. 
98 See Henri Neuendorf, Art Demystified: What Determines an Artwork’s Value?, 
ARTNET NEWS (June 29, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/art-demystified-artworks-
value-533990 [https://perma.cc/FLY3-9TX2]. 
99 Xiang, supra note 10, at 1702. 
100 Katie L. Steiner, Dealing with Laundering in the Swiss Art Market: New Legislation 
and its Threat to Honest Traders, 49 CASE WESTERN RESERVE J. INT’L L. 351, 359 
(2017). 
101 Eileen Kinsella, Amid a Booming Market, UOVO Plans to Open its Fourth Art 
Storage Facility in Bushwick, Brooklyn’s Hipster Art Capital, ARTNET NEWS (Aug. 27, 
2018), https://news.artnet.com/market/uovo-bushwick-brooklyn-1337819 [https://
perma.cc/RH3W-9NKX]; see also, e.g., Eileen Kinsella, Inside the Uber-High-Tech Art 
Warehouse That Doubles as New York’s First-Ever Freeport, ARTNET NEWS (May 2, 
2018), https://news.artnet.com/market/the-first-ever-freeport-in-new-york-is-a-super-
high-tech-art-warehouse-1275194 [https://perma.cc/SE3B-3VE9] [hereinafter Kinsella, 
Uber-High-Tech Art Warehouse] (describing ARCIS, New York’s first, duty-free art 
storage space). 
102 Steiner, supra note 1010. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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art lending services. Art lending allows an investor to quickly 
access some of the value of a work of art, without bearing the costs 
of selling it.105 Mostly specialized boutiques106 and auction 
houses107 engage in art monetizing services;108 however, banks 
sometimes outsource art management groups to offer art-based 
loans.109 Art lending services include term loans, acquisition 
financing, revolving lines of credit, dealer inventory financing, 
bridging loans, and arranging loans to museums and exhibitions.110 
A lender typically will offer 45% to 60% of the market value of the 
work.111 Thus, art financing allows an art investor to use the value 
of her art—without selling it—such that she can engage in other 
investment opportunities.112 While freeports and art lending are not 
necessarily new methods of accessing art’s value,113 they are 
becoming increasingly accessible to investors.114 
 
105 Sofo, supra note 12. 
106 See, e.g., Art Financing, ARTEMUS, http://www.artemus.com/sale-leaseback 
[https://perma.cc/EV5T-U4HY] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
107 See, e.g., Sotheby’s Financial Services, SOTHEBY’S, https://www.sothebys.com
/en/about/services/sothebys-financial-services [https://perma.cc/PAY5-RACJ] (last 
visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
108 Picinati di Torcello, supra note 90, at 16. 
109 Graham, supra note 57, at 326. 
110 Picinati di Torcello, supra note 90, at 16, 
111 Graham, supra note 57, at 327. 
112 See Sofo, supra note 12. 
113 Graham, supra note 57, at 326 (noting that art lending existed almost thirty years 
ago) (citing Skate’s art industry investment report of February 2013 at p. 22). 
114 See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 100, at 355 (noting the expansion of the Swiss Freeport 
in 2014); Sofo, supra note 12 (noting that traditional banks would only lend against art 
with the additional support of the client’s “financial assets or general creditworthiness,” 
whereas Athena—a monetizing fund—has greater flexibility to lend primarily against a 
collector’s art). In the last five years, art financing has grown 15% to 20% each year and 
is now a $15,000,000,000 market in the United States. Katya Kazakina, Art of Shadow 
Banking: How an Auction House Got into the Picture, WEALTH MGMT. (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.wealthmanagement.com/high-net-worth/art-shadow-banking-how-auction-
house-got-picture [https://perma.cc/E2JE-Y7PE] (citing ART & FINANCE REPORT 2016, 
DELOITTE 117 (2016) https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/at/Documents
/finance/art-and-finance-report2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CXP-JKSJ]).  
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D. The Potential for Money Laundering Through Art:  
A Vulnerable Market 
The lack of regulation of high-value transactions combined 
with increasingly greater access to art’s value has left an art market 
that is particularly vulnerable to money laundering.115 
Additionally, several characteristics of art and art dealers’ practices 
make it a particularly attractive laundering tool.116 Thus, while 
there are no existing convictions for money laundering achieved 
solely through the purchase and sale of art, and the extent of this 
problem is not entirely clear,117 the potential certainly is. This 
Section explores in depth the characteristics of the modern art 
market that make it vulnerable to money laundering. 
1. Art as an Asset 
Rising prices and investment opportunities in the modern high-
end art market have made it vulnerable to money laundering for 
several reasons.118 First, the high value of an individual work of art 
is beneficial rather than prohibitive to money launderers.119 It is 
much easier for a money launderer to cleanse her ill-gotten gains 
through a transaction involving one expensive asset rather than 
several transactions of less expensive goods.120 Additionally, a 
money launderer has substantial capital, presumably from 
partaking in illegal acts, to purchase a work of art and does not 
have the “same economic rationale for transactions” as legitimate 
investors.121 Thus, a high acquisition price is beneficial rather than 
prohibitive to money launderers.122 
Second, investors’ use of new tools to combat art’s illiquidity 
have also fostered criminal activity. A recent example 
demonstrates how a money launderer might take advantage of an 
 
115 DELOITTE, supra note 29 at 3. “Booming economies might not yet be fully aware of 
money laundering risks or equipped to identify money laundering schemes.” Id.  
116 Teichmann, supra note 31, at 133–34. 
117 See Small, supra note 21. Anti-money laundering expert John Byrne addressed the 
lack of convictions, noting this did not prove the absence of the crime itself. Id. 
118 DELOITTE, supra note 29, at 3. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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art monetizing fund.123 In November 2018, the United States 
charged Low Taek Jho and other Malaysian officials with 
conspiring to launder money embezzled from a Malaysian 
investment fund.124 The government alleged that Low attempted to 
launder money “through the U.S. financial system by purchasing, 
among other things, luxury residential real estate in New York City 
and elsewhere, and artwork from a New York-based auction house, 
and by funding major Hollywood films.”125 The launderers 
purchased paintings from Christie’s by Basquiat, Rothko, and Van 
Gogh.126 Later, a Cayman Island Company, which Low wholly 
owned, obtained a loan of $107,000,000 from Sotheby’s, using 
several of the paintings purchased from Christie’s as collateral.127 
Thus, art monetizing services enable money launderers, as well as 
legitimate buyers, to access the value of a work. 
2. Confidentiality in Transactions 
A unique aspect of the art market is the anonymity involved in 
transactions through professional intermediaries such as private 
dealers and auction houses. Often, the buyer and seller in private 
sales and public auctions do not know one another’s identities128 
 
123 See Kazakina, supra note 114. 
124 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Malaysian Financier Low Taek Jho, Also 
Known As “Jho Low,” and Former Banker Ng Chong Hwa, Also Known As “Roger Ng,” 
Indicted for Conspiring to Launder Billions of Dollars in Illegal Proceeds and to Pay 
Hundreds of Millions of Dollars in Bribes (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/malaysian-financier-low-taek-jho-also-known-jho-low-and-former-banker-ng-
chong-hwa-also-known [https://perma.cc/B9AK-DWVD]. 
125 Id. 
126 Graham Bowley & William K. Rashbaum, Has the Art Market Become an Unwitting 
Partner in Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19
/arts/design/has-the-art-market-become-an-unwitting-partner-in-crime.html 
[https://perma.cc/G5P2-EE33]. 
127 Id. A former special prosecutor for the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Art Crime 
Team explains that money launderers may choose to take advantage of art loans from 
small boutiques or auction houses rather than large banks because “[t]he level of scrutiny 
you’ll receive from a bank is much higher than you will receive from an auction house.” 
See Kazakina, supra note 114 (internal quotations omitted). Before taking a loan from 
Sotheby’s, Low had explained to his art dealer that he preferred “the boutique banks that 
can move fast” as opposed to “the large ones like [J.P. Morgan].” See id. 
128 Cohen, supra note 53. “A painting might sell at a public auction for more than $100 
million, and the identities of the seller, the guarantor, the external bidders and the final 
buyer will remain cloaked in confidentiality.” Scott Reyburn, A Tug of War Over Art- 
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and even large transactions are often conducted entirely through 
cash.129 Art dealers do not maintain uniform recordkeeping 
practices and often do not share information about their prior sales 
with third parties.130 The ability of purchasers to transact 
anonymously in the art market makes it difficult for authorities to 
trace a money launderer to an underlying crime, especially if art 
dealers have no incentive to report suspicious activity.131 A recent 
case provides an example of how a money launderer could hide 
behind a professional art intermediary to launder illicit gains 
without detection. In March 2018, the United States charged 
Matthew Green,132 an art dealer in the United Kingdom, with 
conspiracy to hide $9,000,000 obtained through a securities fraud 
scheme under section 1956(a)(3)(A)(ii) of the MLCA.133 
According to the indictment, Green and three other individuals 
proposed a plan to an undercover agent, posing as a member of the 
money laundering conspiracy, for him to purchase a Picasso 
painting titled Personnages from Green.134 The agent would 
purchase the painting, estimated to be worth $4,000,000 to 
$7,000,000 in 2010, using some of the proceeds from the securities 
fraud.135 The agent would then keep the painting for an unspecified 
amount of time until Green arranged to resell it, and Green would 
 
Sales Transparency, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com
/2015/09/28/arts/international/a-tug-of-war-over-art-sales-transparency.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/Z3JN-7BDM]. 
129 Teichmann, supra note 31, at 134; DELOITTE, supra note 29, at 3. 
130 Shea, supra note 15, at 671–72. 
131 See Scott Reyburn, What the Panama Papers Reveal About the Art Market, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/arts/design/what-the-
panama-papers-reveal-about-the-art-market.html [https://perma.cc/5VPW-PXGA]. 
132 Green’s father, Richard Green, is a well-known art dealer in London, and owns the 
Richard Green Art Gallery. Eileen Kinsella, UK Art Dealer Matthew Green Charged in a 
$9 Million Picasso Money-Laundering Scheme, ARTNET NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/matthew-green-charged-money-laundering-us-1236929 
[https://perma.cc/8FJN-4NF4]. 
133 Superseding Indictment at 7, 26–27, United States v. Kyriacou, No. 18-102 (S-1) 
(KAM) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2018). Section 1956(a)(3)(A) covers financial transaction 
offenses where law enforcement pose as agents attempting to launder money, thus 
tricking the suspected money launderer into conveying his plan. DOYLE, supra note 6, at 
8. 
134 Superseding Indictment, supra note 133, at 17–18. 
135 Kinsella, supra note 132. 
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then transfer the proceeds to the agent through a bank account in 
the United States.136 One of the members of the conspiracy 
explained to the agent that they had chosen to launder part of their 
proceeds through art because the art market is “‘the only market 
that is unregulated.’”137 
Two other methods of investing in art also allow a buyer to 
maintain anonymity. First, collectors and investors may keep their 
identity private by using shell corporations to purchase art.138 
Second, in addition to providing lower transaction costs, freeports 
also allow investors to store their works confidentially.139 A recent 
example of a transaction revealed by the Panama Papers 
demonstrates the usefulness of these layering techniques for money 
launderers. In 2012, Phillipe Maestracci, the grandson of a Jewish 
art dealer, sued the Nahmad Gallery for the return of a painting by 
Amedeo Modigliani titled Seated Man with a Cane that he alleged 
the Nazis stole from his grandfather.140 The Nahmad family 
asserted that they did not have the painting and Christie’s records 
showed that an offshore corporation registered in Panama, called 
International Art Center, purchased it in 1996 at an auction.141 In 
2016, the release of the Panama Papers revealed that the Nahmad 
family is actually the sole shareholder of International Art 
Center.142 Maestracci was not able to link the Nahmad family to 
the International Art Center previously because there were multiple 
layers of anonymity between the two.143 First, the International Art 
Center was incorporated in Panama, a secrecy jurisdiction that 
renders the discovery of beneficial ownership of a shell 
 
136 Id. 
137 Id.; see also Superseding Indictment, supra note 133, at 16–17. 
138 See, e.g., Reyburn, supra note 128. “A shell corporation is a corporation without 
active business operations or significant assets.” See Shell Corporation, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shellcorporation.asp [https://perma.cc/G8MG-
GUW4] (last visted Dec. 7, 2018). See generally Maestracci v. Helly Nahmad Gallery, 
Inc., 155 A.D.3d 401 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
139 Steiner, supra note 100, at 357–58. 
140 Maestracci, 155 A.D.3d at 401–02. 
141 Id. at 402; Reyburn, supra note 128. 
142 John Zarobell, What the Panama Papers Do Not Reveal About the Art Market, INT’L 
ART & CULTURE (Oct. 3, 2016), http://sfaq.us/2016/10/what-the-panama-papers-do-not-
reveal-about-the-art-market [https://perma.cc/XB99-X67N]. 
143 Id. 
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corporation impracticable.144 Second, the Nahmad family stored 
the works confidentially in a freeport.145 Thus, while the Nahmad 
family did not launder money through the purchase of the 
Modigliani painting, this case demonstrates how an individual can 
purchase a work of art without leaving any trace of her identity.146 
3. Speculative Pricing 
The lack of price transparency for artwork is also attractive to 
money launderers.147 Art’s intangible aspects make it difficult, 
especially for investors who are new to the market, to value.148 
Trends and personal tastes often affect the price of a work.149 
Buyers are interested in new artists who will be “the next big 
thing” in the market as well as those artists who have already 
 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Another interesting example of anonymity in the art market is the use of third-party 
guarantors in auctions. Lawrence M. Kaye & Howard N. Spiegler, The Art Market: 
Would More Regulation Spoil All the Fun?, HERRICK (Oct. 2016), http://
www.herrick.com/publications/the-art-market-would-more-regulation-spoil-all-the-fun 
[https://perma.cc/XD64-MLDJ]. Auction houses often advance money to a bidder to 
acquire the artwork before the auction or make an agreement with a private dealer or 
collector to guarantee the price. Id. While long-time bidders might know these third 
parties exist, they often do not know who they are. See id. For example, in 1997, 
Christie’s sold a 118-piece collection of modernist works, including several by Pablo 
Picasso, for $206,500,000. Reyburn, supra note 128. At the time of the sale, the buying-
public assumed the collection was “fresh from the estate” of the Manhattan couple who 
had put it together. See id. The Panama Papers later revealed, however, that the majority 
of the works in the collection had previously been sold to a billionaire currency trader 
who made a sizable profit by flipping the works with Christie’s help. See id.; Juliette 
Garside et al., How Offshore Firm Helped Billionaire Change the Art World Forever, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/07
/panama-papers-joe-lewis-offshore-art-world-picasso-christies [https://perma.cc/Q4JD-
NDLT]. 
147 But see Margaret Carrigan, US Anti-Money Laundering Bill Could Reappear Early 
Next Year, THE ART NEWSPAPER (Dec. 11, 2018, 11:24 GMT), https://
www.theartnewspaper.com/news/us-anti-money-laundering-bill-could-reappear-early-
next-year [https://perma.cc/99CP-4L72]. (citing former specialist with United States 
Customs and the Department of Homeland Security, James McAndrew, who argues that 
the speculative nature of art actually makes it an ineffective tool for money laundering.) 
148 Neuendorf, supra note 98 (“To art world outsiders, the distinctions in price can be 
confusing.”). 
149 See id. 
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achieved recognition in their respective periods.150 Furthermore, 
the price of a work of art may be dependent on its aesthetic or 
sentimental value to particular collectors.151 How rare or unique a 
work of art is will also influence its price.152 These intangible 
values can be difficult for those who are not art experts to 
quantify.153 Furthermore, there is currently no “standardized art 
valuation methodology” or “quantitative analysis” to determine the 
fair market value of a piece of artwork.154 
This uncertainty surrounding art’s valuation allows a money 
launderer to manipulate the price of a work of art,155 which is 
advantageous to a criminal scheme for several reasons. First, it 
allows a money launderer to import or export a work of art across 
borders without detection.156 Through “trade-based money 
laundering” a criminal can transfer the value gained from an illicit 
crime by moving an asset such as art out of one country and into 
another.157 Because U.S. customs law does not require 
documentation of merchandise worth less than $200, a criminal 
can avoid customs detection by stating a work’s value as less than 
that amount.158 Additionally, customs officials are not art experts, 
and therefore, do not have the knowledge base to question the 
stated price of a work.159 Thus, a launderer can purchase a work of 
 
150 See id. 
151 Picinati di Torcello, supra note 90, at 21 (explaining that experts usually determine 
the price of a work through a qualitative analysis of “the scarcity of supply relative to 
demand, consumption utility and individual perceptions.”). 
152 Neuendorf, supra note 98. 
153 Id. 
154 Picinati di Torcello, supra note 90, at 21. There is also no “government agency or 
industry organization” to oversee how works of art are valued before a sale. See 
Christopher Lopez, In Plain Sight: Hiding Illicit Funds in Artwork, BANKING EXCHANGE 
(Mar. 9, 2018, 11:45 PM), http://m.bankingexchange.com/news-feed/item/7418-in-plain-
sight-hiding-illicit-funds-in-artwork [https://perma.cc/T9YU-LCR4]. 
155 Lopez, supra note 154. 
156 Shea, supra note 15, at 674. 
157 Purkey, supra note 7, at 126. 
158 Cohen, supra note 53. 
159 Purkey, supra note 7, at 126. 
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art worth millions of dollars, and transport it into the United States 
by stating it is worth only $100 without raising suspicion.160 
Second, launderers can manipulate the price of a work at 
purchase or sale.161 For example, a launderer might inflate the 
acquisition price of a piece to launder more money through it162 or 
sell a work at an inflated price.163 Due to the somewhat subjective 
nature of art, innocent purchasers and authorities would be hard-
pressed to determine whether a purchaser has overpaid.164 One 
recent example of a dispute between a buyer and a seller 
demonstrates the difficulty of identifying price manipulation, and 
how a money launderer might enlist a professional art intermediary 
to help her to do so. In October 2018, a billionaire art collector, 
Dmitry Rybolovlev brought suit against Sotheby’s in New York 
for aiding Yves Bouvier, a Swiss art dealer, in defrauding him 
through the sale of several works of art.165 Rybolovlev previously 
brought suit against Bouvier, who purchased the works for lower 
values than he disclosed, and then sold them to Rybolovlev at an 
inflated price.166 For example, Bouvier sold Rybolovlev one piece, 
by Modigliani, for $118,000,000, despite having previously 
purchased it for only $93,500,000 from a private collector.167 In his 
suit against Sotheby’s, Rybolovlev claimed that the auction house 
“knowingly and intentionally bolstered the plaintiffs’ ‘trust and 
confidence in Bouvier and rendered the whole edifice of fraud 
plausible and credible’ by brokering certain sales and inflated 
 
160 Shea, supra note 15, at 674 (providing as an example a Brazilian banker’s import of 
a Jean-Michel Basquiat painting entitled Hannibal worth $8,000,000 by listing the price 
of the work as $100). 
161 Lopez, supra note 154; The Art Market and Money Laundering: A Symposium, CASE 
WESTERN RESERVE U. SCH. LAW (Oct. 12, 2018), https://law.case.edu/Lectures-
Events/EventId/386/e/the-art-market-and-money-laundering-a-symposium-12-oct-2018 
[https://perma.cc/7DNL-Q5AC].  
162 See, e.g., DELOITTE, supra note 29, at 3.  
163 See Steiner, supra note 100, at 363 (describing money laundering opportunities in 
the Swiss freeports); see also CASE WESTERN RESERVE U. SCH. LAW, supra note 161. 
164 Steiner, supra note 100, at 364; Lopez, supra note 154. 
165 Margaret Carrigan, Russian Billionaire Rybolovlev Sues Sotheby’s for $380m in 
Fraud Damages, ART NEWSPAPER (Oct. 3, 2018, 20:38 GMT), https://
www.theartnewspaper.com/news/russian-billionaire-rybolovlev-sues-sotheby-s-for-
usd380m-in-fraud-damages [https://perma.cc/T3EF-Z79K]. 
166 Id. 
167 Steiner, supra note 100, at 363–64. 
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valuations.”168 While Bouvier did not launder money through this 
sale, the transaction demonstrates the lack of price transparency in 
the sale of art, which exists as a tool for money launderers. 
II. REGULATION VERSUS PRACTICE: IMPOSING ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING LEGISLATION ON THE MODERN ART MARKET 
While the vulnerability of the art market makes clear the need 
for measures to prevent money laundering, the implementation of 
regulatory burdens presents a substantial conflict between the 
government’s and market operators’ interests. Section II.A 
provides an overview of a recent proposal for specific legislation to 
target money laundering in the art market. Section II.B describes 
the art market’s criticisms of the bill and regulation in the art 
market in general. Section II.C examines similar conflicts arising 
from the application of BSA regulations to real estate and precious 
metals dealers. 
A. The Illicit Art and Antiquities Trafficking Prevention Act 
A recent proposal for legislation would implement the first 
regulations to directly target money laundering through art.169 On 
May 18, 2018, Congressman Luke Messer introduced an 
amendment to the BSA, the Illicit Art and Antiquities Trafficking 
Prevention Act (the “Illicit Art Act”), that would add “dealers in 
art or antiquities” to the list of financial institutions under the 
BSA.170 Thus, in addition to reporting cash transactions over 
$10,000, professional art intermediaries would also be responsible 
for at a minimum “(i) the development of internal policies, 
procedures and controls; (ii) the designation of a compliance 
officer; (iii) an ongoing employee training program; and (iv) an 
independent audit function to test [programs].”171 Additionally, 
dealers, as financial institutions, would also likely have to file 
 
168 Carrigan, supra note 165. 
169 Kinsella, supra note 65. 
170 Illicit Art and Antiquities Trafficking Prevention Act, H.R. 5886, 115th Cong. 
(2018). The Illicit Art Act lapsed at the end of December, and needs a new sponsor as 
Congressman Messer lost his seat in the midterm elections. Carrigan, supra note 147. 
However, the bill may be re-introduced in 2019. Id. 
171 Boles, supra note 8, at 493. 
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Suspicious Activity Reports with FinCEN.172 The specific 
regulations that FinCEN enforces in the art market under the 
authority of the act would likely be similar to those for dealers in 
precious metals, stones, and jewels.173 For example, the art market 
has speculated that the regulations would apply to dealers in art or 
antiquities who purchase more than $50,000 in covered goods and 
receive the same amount in gross proceeds from the sale of 
artwork each year.174 
Congressman Messer has stated the purpose of the Illicit Art 
Act is to “reduce international money laundering and crack down 
on terrorist organizations like ISIS.”175 The amendment would 
specifically target the pervasive anonymity in art market 
transactions, by creating strong incentives for dealers to prevent 
money laundering.176 Art dealers would have to take the same 
compliance measures as other “financial institutions” under the 
BSA, and the financial consequences of non-compliance with the 
BSA can be quite large.177 Thus, the regulatory burdens would 
theoretically prevent dealers and auction houses from turning a 
blind eye to money laundering, and encourage them to join 
investigators and prosecutors in helping to detect it. 
 
172 See id. at 483. FinCEN did not impose the requirement of suspicious activities 
reports on dealers in precious metals, stones, and jewels. See Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Dealers in Precious Metals, 
Stones, or Jewels, 70 Fed. Reg. 33702 (proposed June 9, 2005) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 
103). 
173 CULT. PROP. NEWS, supra note 20 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 1027.100 (2018)). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. According to the Washington Post, estimates of how much money ISIS had made 
from the sale of looted antiquities range from $4,000,000 to $7,000,000,000. Fiona Rose-
Greenland, How Much Money Has ISIS Made Selling Antiquities? More than Enough to 
Fund Its Attacks, WASH. POST (June 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/posteverything/wp/2016/06/03/how-much-money-has-isis-made-selling-antiquities-
more-than-enough-to-fund-its-attacks/?utm_ter [https://perma.cc/68CF-TZQM]. 
176 Kinsella, supra note 65. “The new law would zero in on the beating heart of the art 
market: the financial relationship between dealers and their clients….” Id. (quoting 
Thomas C. Danziger, of Danziger, Danziger & Muro) (internal quotations omitted). 
177 For example, FinCen charged B.A.K. Precious Metals, Inc. $200,000 in regulatory 
fines for failing to adopt compliance measures under the BSA. FinCen Assesses Money 
Penalty Against Precious Metals Dealer for Violations of Anti-Money Laundering Law, 
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.fincen.gov
/sites/default/files/news_release/20151230.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8QQ-2XNR].  
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B. A Dealer’s Perspective: Opposing Regulation of the Art 
Market and the Illicit Art Act 
Organizations representing professional art intermediaries have 
opposed regulations in the art market, including the Illicit Art Act, 
for several reasons.178 First, dealers are concerned that regulations 
would hinder positive relationships with clients who value their 
privacy. Second, small businesses in the art market are worried 
about the costs of compliance with the BSA. Finally, pushback 
from the art market reflects the sentiment that art’s inherent value 
and speculative pricing should exempt it from regulation as a 
commodity. 
1. Privacy in Transactions 
While the pervasive anonymity in the art market allows money 
launderers to hide their identities, it also has several legitimate 
benefits to collectors and investors. For example, a collector may 
want to avoid the embarrassment of public inquiry if she is selling 
her artwork because of a financial rut.179 Collectors may also 
generally want to prevent “industry gossip” pertaining to their sale 
of a work.180 Additionally, a valuable work becomes vulnerable to 
theft if it is sold to a collector whose name is publicly disclosed 
and left in the collector’s home.181 Anonymous transactions and 
confidential storage spaces such as freeports allow individuals to 
protect their expensive collections from theft.182 As explained 
above, a savvy investor might also utilize the secrecy of a freeport 
to add value to a work by keeping it out of the public eye, and later 
re-introducing it to the market as a “fresh work.”183 Ultimately, art 
dealers may choose not to reveal their clients’ information to third 
 
178 See, e.g., Letter from Clinton R. Howell, President, CINOA, to Jeb Hensarling, 
Chairman, Fin. Servs. Comm., https://culturalpropertynews.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/letter-from-CINOA.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7TC-AZ4G] (raising the three 
concerns listed in this paragraph, as well as casting doubt on the claim that art and 
antiquities are used to launder funds for terrorism). 
179 Steiner, supra note 100, at 357–58. 
180 Shea, supra note 15, at 679–80. 
181 Steiner, supra note 100, at 358. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 359. 
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parties or keep records of their transactions,184 because these 
practices are beneficial to collectors and investors, not because 
they are trying to promote criminal activity.185 
In light of the above considerations, the possibility that the 
application of the BSA to the art industry might require extensive 
investigations by dealers into their clients’ backgrounds and 
identities poses a serious conflict.186 The development of internal 
policies and procedures under the BSA might require dealers to 
verify the identity of their clients or investigate their 
backgrounds.187 Furthermore, an independent audit would force a 
dealer to give a third-party auditor access to the information the 
dealer does gain about her client.188 According to international art 
confederation CINOA, requiring clients to provide identifying 
information would actually deter them from purchasing artwork.189 
Many dealers are also worried that information provided to the 
government could lead to government searches of private 
collections.190 Consequently, while the Illicit Art Act targets the 
use of anonymity for criminal gains, it may also have a negative 
effect on clients’ legitimate privacy interests. 
2. Regulatory Burdens on Small Businesses 
The compliance burdens of an anti-money laundering program 
under the BSA have two potential negative effects on the art 
industry. First, as the ADAA has argued, small businesses may not 
be able to incur the costs of regulatory burdens.191 As Joe Laird of 
 
184 Shea, supra note 15, at 671–72. 
185 See Letter from Clinton R. Howell, President, CINOA, to Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, 
Fin. Servs. Comm., supra note 178. 
186 See CULT. PROP. NEWS, supra note 20. 
187 See, e.g., Kevin L. Shepherd, The USA PATRIOT Act: The Complexities of Imposing 
Anti-Money Laundering Obligations on the Real Estate Industry, 39 REAL PROP., PROB. 
& TR. J. 403, 424 (explaining the potential application of the same standards to lawyers in 
real estate dealings). 
188 See id. at 425 (explaining the potential application of the same standards to lawyers 
in real estate dealings). 
189 Letter from Clinton R. Howell, President, CINOA, to Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, 
Fin. Servs. Comm., supra note 178. 
190 CULT. PROP. NEWS, supra note 20. 
191 Anna Louie Sussman, Galleries Could Face “Unnecessary and Onerous” 
Regulation Under New Legislation, ARTSY (May 24, 2018, 12:38 PM), https://
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Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP notes, dealers “‘come in all 
shapes and sizes . . . . They can be large galleries with a number of 
different locations, or they can be literally someone in Kansas 
working out of their apartment.’”192 The implementation of an anti-
money laundering program under the BSA might be entirely 
feasible for large auction houses which appear already to have 
similar programs in place.193 Yet, compliance under the BSA can 
cost from $2000 to $5000 for small businesses each year.194 
Accordingly, art and antiquities dealers have argued that 
compliance costs would be quite burdensome for small businesses 
who do not have the same “infrastructures or resources” as the 
major auction houses.195 Second, the imposition of compliance 
burdens could deter individual collectors from expanding their 
collections. As art and cultural heritage attorney Leila 
Amineddoleh explains, there are many individuals who collect art 
for their own enjoyment—as opposed to professional dealers 
whose objective is to make a profit from the purchase and quick 
sale of art—but still trade in millions of dollars of art each year.196 
With extensive regulation, those individual collectors who are not 
willing to adopt anti-money laundering programs may turn to 
collecting other luxury assets instead, thereby impairing the art 
industry as a whole. 
3. The Character of Art 
Another concern with proposed regulation of the art market is 
the treatment of art as a commodity. According to this view, the 
government should not regulate art in the same way it regulates 
financial commodities197 because art has cultural and other 
 
www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-galleries-face-unnecessary-onerous-regulation-new-
legislation [https://perma.cc/N8XD-QNWE]. 
192 Id. (quoting Laird). 
193 See supra Section I.C.2; see also Kinsella, supra note 65 (citing Michael 
McCullough, previously associate counsel at Sotheby’s). 
194 CULT. PROP. NEWS, supra note 20. 
195 Sussman, supra note 191; Small, supra note 21. 
196 Small, supra note 54 (quoting Leila Amineddoleh). 
197 “A commodity is a basic good used in commerce that is interchangeable with other 
commodities of the same type.” Commodity, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodity.asp [https://perma.cc/SB5Y-AAM8] (last 
updated Apr. 23, 2018). 
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intangible values, and no set value.198 For example, determining 
the price of a jewel involves a quantitative evaluation of its cut, 
clarity, and color.199 In contrast, as explained above, an evaluation 
of the price of a piece of art involves substantial qualitative 
evaluation of the history of the work, current market trends, 
inherent cultural and aesthetic values, and how rare the piece is.200 
Furthermore, there is no standardized valuation methodology for 
determining the price of a piece of art.201 Thus, because art is not a 
commodity, art market operators have argued that it should not be 
subject to the same regulations as commodity goods.202 
C. Similar BSA Conflicts in Other Markets 
In considering how to apply regulations to the art market, it is 
helpful to examine the application of the BSA to other financial 
markets. The imposition of the BSA on real estate and precious 
metals dealers presented similar conflicts of client confidentiality 
and financial burdens. This Section describes the relevant conflicts 
and several proposals for or final resolutions of them. 
1. The BSA and Real Estate Dealers 
After the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, FinCEN attempted 
to craft regulations for “persons involved in real estate closings and 
settlements”—essentially all real estate dealers—which are part of 
the BSA’s definition of financial institutions.203 As this definition 
was somewhat broad and ambiguous,204 FinCEN temporarily 
 
198 Small, supra note 54. 
199 See, e.g., Gem Price Guide, INT’L GEM SOC’Y, https://www.gemsociety.org
/article/gem-pricing-guide-sample [https://perma.cc/PQ9T-V9L9] (last visited Dec. 7, 
2018). 
200 See supra Section I.D.3. 
201 See supra Section I.D.3. 
202 Small, supra note 21. 
203 Shepherd, supra note 187, at 406. Congress added real estate dealers to the 
definition of “financial institutions” in 1988. Id. at 407. 
204 Id. at 414–15 (explaining that “‘[t]he universe of participants in real estate 
transactions is potentially broad, even in the simplest residential real estate transaction.’ 
In all real estate closings and settlements, the participants include the buyer and the seller. 
Beyond those two core participants, the participants in a real estate closing and settlement 
may include the real estate agent or broker; the mortgage lender; the mortgage banker; 
the appraiser; the surveyor; the title insurance company; the respective lawyers for the 
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exempted this group from BSA compliance in 2002 to consider its 
specific characteristics before implementing regulations.205 
FinCEN has yet to promulgate final regulations for real estate 
dealers, but in 2003 it issued an advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking for relevant market operators to comment on what the 
regulations should look like.206 Several market operators responded 
to the invitation for comment, noting in particular the difficulty 
lawyers involved in real estate transactions would face in 
complying with BSA reporting requirements while maintaining 
attorney-client confidentiality.207 Under the Model Rules of 
Professional Responsibility, “[a] fundamental principle in the 
client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s 
informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating 
to the representation . . . .This contributes to the trust that is the 
hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.”208 Thus, the imposition 
of BSA compliance, requiring that an attorney investigate her 
clients’ background and allow for an independent auditor to review 
this information,209 would not be compatible with these goals.210 
The investigation into the client’s background alone would create a 
problematic “adversarial relationship” between the attorney and 
her client, while revelation of information to a third party would 
violate the duty of confidentiality.211 Market operators were also 
concerned that the regulations would impose significant burdens 
on real estate dealers who do not engage in many transactions.212 
The comment letters included several suggestions for how 
FinCEN might tailor regulations in the real estate market to avoid 
confidentiality conflicts and onerous compliance burdens.213 Three 
 
buyer, seller, and lender; an escrow agent; the environmental consultant; the pest 
inspector; and the building inspector or engineer. Thus, a real estate closing and 
settlement may involve over a dozen participants.” (alteration in original)). 
205 See Boles, supra note 8, at 493–94.  
206 Shepherd, supra note 187, at 410. 
207 Id. at 421. 
208 Id. at 423 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2018)). 
209 See supra Section I.B.1. 
210 See Shepherd, supra note 187, at 424–25. 
211 See id. at 424–25. 
212 See id. at 421. 
213 See id. at 428–32. 
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are particularly relevant. First, the Real Property Section of the 
Florida Bar (“Florida Real Property Section”) suggested that to 
protect the lawyer-client relationship, attorneys should be 
exempted entirely from anti-money laundering regulations.214 
Second, to prevent overburdening real estate dealers, the Mortgage 
Bankers Association of America (“MBAA”) proposed a safe 
harbor for persons involved in real estate closings “if they contract 
with other financial institutions to collect or verify customer 
identification.”215 Similarly, the American Land Title Association 
(“ALTA”) suggested that FinCEN exempt transactions such as 
residential mortgage loan refinances, which have a low risk of 
money laundering.216 
2. The BSA and Precious Metals Dealers 
The definition of “financial institutions” under the BSA also 
includes “a dealer in precious metals, stones, or jewels.”217 In 
2002, FinCEN deferred application of anti-money laundering 
requirements to precious metals dealers to examine the industry.218 
In response to FinCEN’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
businesses selling precious metals pointed out that imposition of 
regulations in this industry presented substantial compliance 
burdens.219 In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FinCEN 
addressed the fact that businesses that purchase precious metals 
from other dealers are less vulnerable to money laundering because 
 
214 See id. at 430 (citing Letter from Louis B. Guttmann, Chair-Elect, Real Property, 
Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar, to FinCEN I n.1 (June 9, 2003), 
http://www.fincen.gov/guttmann.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q65T-JBGC]). 
215 See id. at 431 (citing Letter from Stephen A. Bromberg, President, American 
College of Mortgage Attorneys, to FinCEN 1 (June 6, 2003), http://www.fincen.gov
/bromberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPZ3-GG38]). 
216 See id. at 432 (citing Letter from Ann vom Eigen, Legislative and Regulatory 
Counsel, American Land Title Association ("ALTA"), to FinCEN 1, 4 (June 5, 2003), 
http://www.fincen.gov/vomeigen.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN4Z-B2XQ]). 
217 Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(N) (2012). 
218 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for 
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 68 Fed. Reg. 8480, 8481 (proposed Feb. 
21, 2003) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103). 
219 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for 
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 70 Fed. Reg. 33702, 33711 (proposed June 
9, 2005) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).  
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to “abuse [the] industry, a money launderer must be able to sell as 
well as purchase” precious metals.220 Thus, “there is substantially 
less risk that a retailer who purchases goods exclusively or almost 
exclusively from dealers” that are already subject to anti-money 
laundering requirements under the regulations would “be abused 
by money launderers.”221 For this reason, in its interim final rule 
FinCEN largely exempted retailers from regulation under the 
BSA.222 Thus, the definition of dealers who must establish money 
laundering programs excludes those retailers who “during the prior 
calendar or tax year, purchased more than $50,000 in covered 
goods from persons other than dealers or other retailers.”223 
FinCEN also addressed the burden presented by the requirement of 
independent auditing.224 In its Interim Final Rule, FinCEN allowed 
precious metals dealers to utilize their own employees—as 
opposed to an unaffiliated service provider—to accomplish the 
BSA’s audit requirement, as long as the employee is not the 
designated compliance officer or otherwise involved in the 
business’s anti-money laundering program.225 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING MONEY LAUNDERING  
IN THE MODERN ART MARKET 
The art market’s vulnerability to money laundering and lack of 
incentive for professional intermediaries to help prevent it makes 
government oversight necessary. This Part proposes several key 
elements of a regulatory framework in the art market as well as 
suggestions for the art market to adopt more standardized 
practices. Section III.A argues for nuanced regulation in the art 
market, which takes into consideration the legitimate concerns of 
professional art intermediaries. Section III.B suggests changes 
from within the art market to prevent money laundering. 
 
220 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for 
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8482. 
221 Id. 
222 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for 
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 70 Fed. Reg. at 33717. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 33711. 
225 See id. 
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A. Regulating the Modern Art Market 
Regulations imposed on the art market should improve rather 
than stifle professional art intermediaries’ relationships with 
collectors and investors. If Congress were to apply the BSA to 
dealers in art or antiquities, FinCEN would have the task of 
interpreting the regulations for the art industry, with the authority 
to consider “the extent to which the requirements imposed . . . are 
commensurate with [dealers’] size, location, and activities . . . .”226 
This Section presents several solutions for tailoring regulations—
whether for the Illicit Art Act or other legislation—so that they aid 
professional art intermediaries in conducting anti-money 
laundering investigations without disrupting the art market. It also 
suggests implementing regulation outside the art market to directly 
target criminal use of shell corporations. 
1. Addressing Compliance and Privacy Concerns 
To prevent overburdening small art dealers and galleries, any 
regulation in the art market should apply only to professional art 
intermediaries who are particularly vulnerable to money 
laundering risks. Money launderers tend to favor high-priced 
pieces to move large amounts of illicit cash.227 Thus, similar to 
low-risk residential mortgage loan refinances, lesser value works 
likely do not pose as high of a money laundering risk as high-value 
works do, and galleries that only sell low-value works or only a 
few high-value works each year should not have to bear the costs 
of compliance.228 Therefore, regulations in the art market should 
exempt transactions involving works of art with low monetary 
values.229 For example, in interpreting the definition of “dealers in 
 
226 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 
352(c), 115 Stat. 272, 322. 
227 DELOITTE, supra note 29, at 3. 
228 Shepherd, supra note 187, at 432 (citing Letter from Ann vom Eigen, Legislative 
and Regulatory Counsel, American Land Title Association ("ALTA"), to FinCEN 1, 4 
(June 5, 2003), http://www.fincen.gov/vomeigen.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN4Z-B2XQ]). 
229 The European Union recently adopted anti-money laundering regulations for the art 
market in its Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive. Eileen Kinsella, Art Dealers Push 
Back Against the European Union’s New Money Laundering Regulations, ARTNET NEWS 
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/european-union-tightens-art-market-
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art or antiquities,” under the definition of “financial institutions” in 
the BSA, dealers should be defined as only those trading in, “[x] 
number or more works above [x] price per year.”230 Thus, the 
regulation would target the most vulnerable transactions, without 
stifling small dealers’ businesses. 
Burdens would also be lessened if regulations applied only to 
professional art intermediaries engaged in the purchase and sale of 
art as businesses, not to individual collectors and investors. As 
explained above, there are wealthy collectors who purchase and 
sell high-value artworks, but are not engaged as professional 
intermediaries.231 Imposing compliance burdens on many of these 
individuals in addition to dealers, would be unnecessarily 
duplicative where they are purchasing most of their works through 
professional intermediaries, such as dealers and auction houses, 
who are already covered under regulations. It would also hurt the 
art industry because collectors forced to establish anti-money 
laundering systems might stop purchasing art altogether and search 
for other luxury items to collect instead.232 Thus, similar to the 
precious metals retailers who purchase mainly from precious 
metals dealers, the potential for money laundering abuse is low in 
transactions between art collectors and art dealers who would 
already have anti-money laundering systems in place under the 
 
oversight-1275338 [https://perma.cc/7K5G-DS9Z]. The regulations require dealers to 
verify the identity of clients who purchase a work for more than 10,000 euros. Id. In 
reaction to this threshold, CINOA commented that “far too many art and antiques market 
transactions would be caught by the measures.” Id. 
230 See, e.g., Loi fédérale sur la mise en oeuvre des recommandations du Groupe 
d’action financière, révisés en 2012 [Federal Law on the Implementation of the Financial 
Action Task Force Recommendations, Revised in 2012] Dec. 12, 2014, FF 9465, 9476, 
arts. 129 (2014) (Switz.), available at https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2014
/9465.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3LS-L9Q3] [hereinafter Loi fédérale]. Recently enacted 
Swiss regulations preventing money laundering in freeports pertain specifically to 
transactions exceeding 100,000 CHF (about $100,000), rather than the gross profit of the 
intermediary. Steiner, supra note 100, at 365–66. Ascertainment of the prices posing the 
most substantial risk of money laundering requires further investigation beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
231 Small, supra note 54 (quoting Leila Amineddoleh). 
232 See supra Section II.B.2. 
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regulation of the art industry.233 Thus, regulations should exempt 
collectors who purchase only a very small portion of their work 
from sellers, other than covered art dealers, or auction houses. For 
example, in the application of the BSA, those collectors who 
purchase less than a certain amount of their art from sellers other 
than “dealers” should be excluded from the definition of “dealers.” 
234 Thus, even if a collector would fit in the definition of 
“dealers”—those professional intermediaries who sell x amount of 
x-priced paintings per year—she would be exempted if most of her 
purchases were from other “dealers.”235 
Finally, to protect art clients’ privacy concerns, regulations 
imposed on the art market should allow a client to maintain 
confidentiality for legitimate reasons in transactions. Clients’ 
privacy concerns center on their fear of public inquiry about the 
sale and the protection of their collections from theft. Thus, 
requiring that an art dealer investigate a client’s background and 
expose client information to a third-party auditor may be a concern 
for many collectors. One way to assuage this concern would be to 
allow art dealers to conduct independent audits through one of 
their employees, rather than an outside auditor, similar to 
FinCEN’s Interim Final Rule for precious metals dealers.236 
Alternatively, the regulations might assuage client concerns by 
giving them a choice of whom to reveal their information to. 
Unlike attorneys who breach their duty of confidentiality to their 
clients if they share their confidential information with anyone,237 
art dealers may be able to share client information with certain 
groups without deterring clients from purchasing art. Similar to the 
 
233 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for 
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 68 Fed. Reg. 8480, 8482 (proposed Feb. 
21, 2003) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103). 
234 See id. 
235 See id. 
236 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for 
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 70 Fed. Reg. 33702, 33711 (proposed June 
9, 2005) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103). 
237 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer shall 
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”). 
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MBAA suggestion that real estate dealers should be exempt if they 
contract with another financial institution to collect or verify 
customer identification, regulations of art dealers could exempt 
transactions involving a financial intermediary such as a credit 
card company.238 For example, regulations for art dealers under the 
BSA could include a safe harbor from identification and due 
diligence for those transactions involving a financial intermediary 
such as a bank.239 If a client were concerned about “industry 
gossip” for example, she might choose to conduct the transaction 
through a bank rather than providing extensive background 
information to the art dealer and auditor. The transaction would 
still be monitored for money laundering risk because the bank 
would have its own systems in place to verify it.240 
2. Targeting Shell Corporations 
As the Nahmad case demonstrates, money launderers can take 
advantage of beneficial ownership to hide their identities in the 
purchase and sale of art.241 The use of shell corporations to hide 
beneficial ownership in transactions creates money laundering 
risks not only in the art industry but also in other industries such as 
real estate.242 Thus, the United States should directly target the lack 
of transparency in beneficial ownership across all industries.243 
One solution is the Incorporation Transparency and Law 
Enforcement Assistance Act (the “Incorporation Transparency 
Act”),244 proposed in 2017, which would require that U.S. 
companies disclose their beneficial ownership to the 
 
238 See, e.g., Loi fédérale, supra note 230 (allowing clients to choose between due 
diligence on the part of the professional intermediary or conducting the transaction 
through a bank). 
239 See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 187, at 431 (describing Mortgage Banker’s 
suggestion that regulations for real estate professionals include a safe harbor for 
“‘persons involved in real estate closing[s] and settlements’ if they contract with other 
financial institutions to collect or verify customer identification.”) 
240 See Steiner, supra note 100, at 365–66. 
241 See generally Maestracci v. Helly Nahmad Gallery, Inc., 155 A.D.3d 401 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2017). 
242 Boles, supra note 8, at 486. 
243 See id. at 505–06. 
244 H.R. 4450, 114th Cong. (2016). 
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government.245 The legislation would task the Treasury 
Department with creating guidelines for the registration of a 
corporation including “(i) identification of beneficial owners by 
name, current address, and non-expired passport or state-issued 
driver’s license; (ii) identification of any affiliated legal entity that 
will exercise control over the incorporated entity; and (iii) 
consistent updating of lists of beneficial owners no later than 60 
days after any change in ownership.”246 
The Incorporation Transparency Act would target anti-money 
laundering risk without disrupting art dealers’ practices because it 
would prevent the use of beneficial ownership for illegitimate aims 
in all markets, not just the art market. Furthermore, it would only 
require that corporations disclose their owners to the government, 
not that clients disclose their identity to professional art 
intermediaries or the public.247 For example, if the Incorporation 
Transparency Act were to pass, then theoretically an individual 
who wanted to obtain beneficial ownership information would 
have to ask the court to require the government to reveal it. 
Nevertheless, in such a case where the plaintiff can demonstrate 
evidence of her need for such information in discovery, it would 
not be impossible to trace the ownership. Thus, an art client could 
utilize a shell corporation to purchase art, while keeping the 
transaction private from the art-buying public for legitimate 
reasons; however, if the government had evidence that the use of a 
shell corporation was actually for laundering purposes, it could 
trace the beneficial ownership to prevent further abuse. 
B. Self-Regulation: Enforcing Professional Standards Within the 
Art Market 
While legislation directly targeted at money laundering through 
art is essential to aiding law enforcement in identifying the crime, 
the art market itself should also begin to develop its own standards 
to protect legitimate dealers and clients. Self-regulation in the art 
 
245 See id. at 497. 
246 See id. at 497–98. 
247 Id. at 505–06 (noting the regulations promulgated through the Incorporation 
Transparency Act should not require public disclosure or a public registry of beneficial 
ownership as this would conflict with privacy concerns in the real estate market). 
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market is equally important, because it would enable uniform 
standards of professional practice in the industry and enforcement 
of such standards from experts who best understand its unique 
characteristics. This kind of standardization is essential, 
particularly in a market that is rapidly expanding and inviting new 
types of clients. 
One suggestion that reflects the changing character of the art 
market towards investment is the creation of a regulatory agency 
similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission.248 This “Art 
Exchange Commission” would enlist existing art organizations and 
art lawyers to create standard policies and best practices by dealers 
and auction houses.249 The commission could also create greater 
transparency by granting licenses to dealers and auction houses 
based on their practices or creating a rating system for 
businesses.250 Legislation might eventually enable such a 
commission to legally enforce its standards in the art market.251 An 
Art Exchange Commission, with regulatory authority, might be a 
nuanced approach to creating greater transparency in the art market 
because the enforcement would come from dealers and art lawyers 
who understand and appreciate the importance of its unique 
characteristics. 
The U.S. art market might also move towards requiring 
licensing for professional art intermediaries with an organization 
like the ADAA.252 Smaller organizations like the ADAA who 
enforce professional standards in the art industry are not 
particularly effective in combatting money laundering because 
they do not have standards specifically addressing this crime, and 
even if they were to adopt money laundering guidelines, dealers 
are not required to join these organizations or adhere to such 
standards.253 Because of a rapidly expanding art market, and the 
 
248 Graham, supra note 57, at 337. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 FAUSTO MARTIN DE SANCTIS, MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH ART 200 (2013) 
(suggesting that Brazil “require licensing to works as an art dealer, so as to lend some 
transparency to their dealings”). 
253 See supra Section I.B.2; Shea, supra note 15, at 673 (describing how the ADAA’s 
exclusive membership makes enforcement of standards across the market impracticable); 
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threat of money laundering, as well as numerous other criminal 
schemes, art dealers should move towards standardized practices 
that are enforceable across the market.254 Additionally, these 
practices should supplement anti-money laundering regulations, 
rather than merely duplicate them. Thus, in addition to ethical 
guidelines requiring that dealers comply with all relevant laws,255 
an organization could also adopt mandatory educational courses 
that teach dealers what red flags to look out for and how to comply 
with anti-money laundering regulations. Efforts from within the 
industry to combat practices that enable money laundering would 
be beneficial as they would come from individuals with knowledge 
of an art business’s operations. Furthermore, these guidelines 
would actually be enforceable if dealers were required to join such 
an organization in order to practice. 
CONCLUSION 
The high-end art market is increasingly becoming an area of 
financial gain, rather than simply intellectual and cultural value. 
Yet, as investors flock to the art world and open doors to new 
investment opportunities, money launderers also enter with 
nefarious ends. The unique culture of privacy and lack of any 
incentive to report suspicious transactions allows launderers to 
access art’s value without detection and while most art dealers are 
honest traders, those such as Green who take advantage of their 
unique positions, have little to fear with regards to detection. 
Without any oversight from the market itself, stringent anti-money 
laundering programs are necessary so that dealers have adequate 
incentive to aid law enforcement in detecting illicit schemes. 
 
see also, e.g., Guidelines on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 
RESPONSIBLE ART MKT, http://responsibleartmarket.org/guidelines/guidelines-on-
combatting-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing [https://perma.cc/CV9D-YBU4] 
(last visited Dec. 7, 2018). Several global organizations, such as Responsible Art Market 
have attempted to create standards in the art market that are similar to BSA anti-money 
laundering compliance measures. Id. 
254 GRAHAM, supra note 57, at 337 (quoting Patty Gerstenblith) (“[T]he art market is an 
active and vital segment of commercial transactions which require the formulation of a 
flexible and realistic yet also adequate model for protection of those consumers who do 
venture into that marketplace.”). 
255 See, e.g., ART DEALERS ASS’N AMERICA, supra note 59. 
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Targeting money laundering through art is important not only 
to identify and punish criminals for their underlying crimes, but 
also to prevent their abuse of art. Criminals who use art to launder 
money view works as mere vessels for cleansing illicit gains, 256 
thus disposing of a work’s aesthetic, cultural, and educational 
values. Philip Rivkin’s scheme, in particular, reflects this reduction 
of art’s value to merely monetary. Rivkin hid of millions of 
dollars-worth of famous photographs and made no attempt to 
prevent the United States from seizing them likely because it was 
not financially beneficial to him to do so.257 
To prevent this abuse without disrupting the culture of the art 
market and legitimate dealers’ practices, legislators and regulators 
must pay careful attention to market operators concerns. In crafting 
regulations for the art market, they should respect legitimate 
reasons for privacy, and avoid burdening dealers who have very 
little vulnerability to money laundering schemes. The art market, 
in the face of increasingly high prices and globalization, should 
also begin to develop more standardized practices and 
enforcement. Thus, with greater oversight and standard 
professional practices, the art market can aid law enforcement in 
preventing money laundering through art. 
 
256 DE SANCTIS, supra note 252, at 58. 
257 Parker et al., supra note 2. 
